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Abstract
We propose a new formal criterion for secure compilation,
providing strong security guarantees for components writ-
ten in unsafe, low-level languages with C-style undefined
behavior. Our criterion goes beyond recent proposals, which
protect the trace properties of a single component against
an adversarial context, to model dynamic compromise in
a system of mutually distrustful components. Each compo-
nent is protected from all the others until it receives an input
that triggers an undefined behavior, causing it to become
compromised and attack the remaining uncompromised com-
ponents. To illustrate this model, we demonstrate a secure
compilation chain for an unsafe language with buffers, pro-
cedures, and components, compiled to a simple RISC abstract
machine with built-in compartmentalization. The protection
guarantees offered by this abstract machine can be achieved
at the machine-code level using either software fault isola-
tion or tag-based reference monitoring. We are working on
machine-checked proofs showing that this compiler satisfies
our secure compilation criterion.
Extended Abstract
Computer systems are distressingly insecure. Visiting a web-
site, opening an email, or serving a client request often suffice
to open the door to control-hijacking attacks. These dev-
astating low-level attacks typically exploit memory-safety
vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows, use-after-frees, or
double frees, which are abundant in large software systems.
Various techniques have been proposed for guarantee-
ing memory safety [1, 10], but the challenges of efficiency,
precision, scalability, backwards compatibility, and effec-
tive deployment have hampered their widespread adoption.
Meanwhile, new mitigation techniques aim at dealing with
the most onerous consequences of memory unsafeness. In
particular, compartmentalization offers a strong, practical
defense against low-level attacks exploiting memory unsafe-
ness [2, 5, 15]. At least three compartmentalization tech-
nologies are widely deployed: process-level privilege sep-
aration [2, 5, 7] (used, e.g., in OpenSSH [12] and for sand-
boxing plugins and tabs in modern web browsers [13]), soft-
ware fault isolation [14] (provided, e.g., by Google Native
Client [16]), and hardware enclaves (e.g., Intel SGX); many
more are on the drawing boards [1, 3, 11, 15].
Such low-level compartmentalizationmechanisms arewell
suited for building more secure compiler chains. In particu-
lar, they can be exposed in unsafe low-level languages like C
and be targeted by their compiler chains to enable efficiently
breaking up large applications into mutually distrustful com-
ponents that run with minimal privileges and that can inter-
act only via well-defined interfaces. Intuitively, protecting
each component from all the others should have strong se-
curity benefits: the compromise of some components should
not compromise the security of the whole application.
What, exactly, are the formal security guarantees one can
obtain from such secure compiler chains? To answer this
question, we start from robust compilation [4], a recently pro-
posed formal criterion for secure compilation, which implies
the preservation of all trace properties even against adversar-
ial contexts. These traces are normally built over events such
as inputs from and outputs to the environment [8]. We write
P ⇓ t to mean that the complete program P can produce
trace t with respect to some operational semantics. Armed
with this, robust compilation is formally stated as:
∀P CT t . CT [P↓] ⇓ t ⇒ ∃CS . CS [P] ⇓ t
For any partial source program P and any (adversarial) target
context CT where CT linked with the compiled variant of P
can produce a (bad) trace t in the target language (written
CT [P↓] ⇓ t ), we can construct a(n adversarial) source-level
context CS that can produce trace t in the source language
when linked with P (i.e., CS [P] ⇓ t ). Intuitively, any attack
trace t that context CT can mount against P↓ can already
be mounted against P by some source language context CS .
Conversely, any trace property that holds of P when linked
with any arbitrary source context will still hold for P↓ when
linked with an arbitrary target context.
In this work, we propose a new formal criterion for secure
compilation that extends robust compilation to protecting
mutually distrustful components against each other in an
unsafe low-level language with C-style undefined behavior.
The characterization of robust compilation above does not
directly apply in this setting, since it assumes the source
language is safe and P cannot have undefined behavior. The
natural way to adapt robust compilation to an unsafe source
language is the following:
∀P CT t . CT [P↓] ⇓ t ⇒ ∃CS t ′. CS [P] ⇓ t ′ ∧ t ′ ≼P t
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Instead of requiring that CS [P] perform the entire trace t ,
we also allow it to produce a finite prefix t ′ that ends with
an undefined behavior in P (which we write as t ′ ≼P t ).
Intuitively, since we want to reason only in terms of safe
source contexts we do not allow CS to exhibit undefined be-
haviors. However, even a safe context can sometimes trigger
an undefined behavior in the protected program P , in which
case there is no way to keep protecting P going forward.
However, P is fully protected until it receives an input that
causes undefined behavior. This is a good step towards a
model of dynamic compromise.
We show that this can be extended to support mutual
distrustful components. We start by taking both partial pro-
grams and contexts to be sets of components and plugging a
program in a context to be linking. We compile sets of com-
ponents by separately compiling each component. We start
with all components being uncompromised and incremen-
tally replace any component that exhibits undefined behavior
in the source with an arbitrary safe component that will now
attack the remaining uncompromised components. Formally,
this is captured by the following property:
{C1, ...,Cn}↓ ⇓ t ⇒ ∃Ai1 , ...,Aim .
(1) ({C1, ...,Cn}\{Ci1 , ...,Cim } ∪ {Ai1 , ...,Aim }) ⇓ t
(2) ∀j ∈ 1...m. ∃t ′ ≺Cij t .
({C1, ...,Cn}\{Ci1 , ...,Ci j−1} ∪ {Ai1 , ...,Ai j−1})↓ ⇓ t ′
What this is saying is that each low-level trace t of a com-
piled set of components {C1, ...,Cn}↓ can be reproduced in
the source language after replacing the compromised compo-
nents {Ci1 , ...,Cim } with source components {Ai1 , ...,Aim }
(part 1). Moreover (part 2), Ci1 , ...,Cim precisely character-
izes a compromise sequence, in which each component Ci j
is taken over by the already compromised components at
that point in time {Ai1 , ...,Ai j−1}. Above we write t ′ ≺Cij t
for expressing that trace t ′ is a prefix of t ending with an
undefined behavior in Ci j .
This new definition allows us to play an iterative game in
which each component is protected until it receives an input
that triggers an undefined behavior, causing it to become
compromised and to attack the remaining uncompromised
components. This is the first security definition in this space
to support both dynamic compromise and mutual distrust,
whose interaction is subtle and has eluded previous attempts
at characterizing the security guarantees of compartmen-
talizing compilation as extensions of fully abstract compila-
tion [6]. We further show that this new security definition
can be obtained by repeatedly applying an instance of the
simpler robust compilation definition above that is phrased
only in terms of a program and a context.
We illustrate this new security definition by applying it to
a new secure compilation chain for an unsafe language with
buffers, procedures, components, and a CompCert-inspired
memory model [9]. We compile this language to a simple
RISC abstract machine with built-in compartmentalization
and areworking on constructingmachine-checked Coq proofs
that this compiler satisfies our secure compilation definition.
In terms of proof effort, we reduce (a safety-variant of) our
property to providing a back-translation of individual finite
trace prefixes to safe high-level contexts together with three
standard simulation proofs, while previous proofs in this
space were much more complex and non-standard [6]. This
gives us hope that our security definition and proof tech-
nique can be scaled to something as large as a secure variant
of CompCert.
Finally, the protection of the compartmentalized abstract
machine can be achieved at the lowest machine-code level
using either software-fault isolation [14] or tag-based refer-
ence monitoring [1]. We designed and are building two such
back ends for our compiler, using property-based testing to
validate that the two are functional and secure.
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